

Message Text

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S/S - MR. MOFFAT

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TAGS: SOPN, PFOR, XG, EG

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HERewith FULL TEXT PHILIP SHABECOFF FRONT PAGE BYLINER, WEDNESDAY, MAY 28, NEW YORK TIMES, HEADLINED "FORD FOREIGN POLICY DIMS KISSINGER ROLE: A NEW IMPRINT."
2. ON ,HE EVE OF PRESIDENT FORD'S WEEK-LONG TRIP TO EUROPE, WHITE HOUSE ADVISERS ARE SAYING THAT HE IS REDUCING HIS RELIANCE ON SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER AND ASSUMING INCREASING COMMAND OVER HIS OWN FOREIGN POLICY.
3. THE PRESIDENT RETAINS FULL CONFIDENCE IN HIS SECRETARY OF STATE AND GENERALLY SHARES MR. KISSINGER'S VIEWS ON DIPLOMACY, THE OFFICIALS SAID. BUT RECENT INTERVIEWS WITH WHITE HOUSE AND OTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, SOME IN HIGH POLICY POSITIONS, INDICATE THAT MR. FORD IS DETERMINED TO PUT HIS OWN STAMP ON FOREIGN POLICY AND HAS SUBSTANTIALLY BROADENED THE CIRCLE OF FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS.
4. EVEN ADMINISTRATION SUPPORTERS OF MR. KISSINGER CONCEDED- UNCLASSIFIED

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ED THAT HIS GRIP ON THE NATION'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS WAS LOOSENING.

5. SOME HIGH WHITE HOUSE AIDES ARE DESCRIBING THE FORTH-

COMING TALKS IN EUROPE AS THE REAL BEGINNING OF THE FORD ERA IN FOREIGN POLICY.

6. THE PRESIDENT WILL MEET WITH OTHER ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN BRUSSELS, WITH SPANISH LEADERS IN MADRID, WITH PRESIDENT ANWAR EL-SADAT OF EGYPT IN SALZBURG, AUSTRIA, AND WITH PRESIDENT GIOVANNI LEONE AND POPE PAUL IN ROME.

7. WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT, THE TRIP TO EUROPE IS NOT EXPECTED BY UNITED STATES OFFICIALS TO PRODUCE ANY MAJOR AGREEMENTS OR NEW INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.

8. THE MEETING WITH THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION IS DESCRIBED BY SOME WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS AS LARGELY CONSULTATIVE AND CEREMONIAL. IT WILL GIVE MR. FORD HIS FIRST OPPORTUNITY AS PRESIDENT TO MEET WITH HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AS A GROUP AND TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE.

9. BUT, AS ONE AIDE SAID, REFLECTING A VIEW WIDELY HELD IN THE WHITE HOUSE, MR. FORD'S TRIP WILL MARK THE FIRST TIME IN OVER A DECADE THAT A UNITED STATES PRESIDENT WILL JOURNEY TO EUROPE WITHOUT HAVING TO CARRY "THE EXCESS BAGGAGE" OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN INDOCHINA.

10. ANOTHER WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT ASSERTED THAT, UP TO NOW, PRESIDENT FORD HAS SPENT MOST OF HIS PRESIDENCY "CLEARING THE DECKS"--IN DOMESTIC AS WELL AS FOREIGN POLICY. SINCE REPLACING RICHARD M. NIXON LAST AUGUST, THIS OFFICIAL SAID, MR. FORD HAS SPENT ALMOST ALL OF HIS ENERGIES COPING WITH THE PROBLEMS HE INHERITED FROM HIS PREDECESSOR: WATERGATE, THE ECONOMY AND SOUTHEAST ASIA.

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11. NOW, WITH THESE PROBLEMS ATTENDED TO FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE, AND WITH MR. FORD'S GROWING CONFIDENCE IN HIS ABILITIES AS A LEADER, HE IS READY TO PUT HIS OWN IMPRINT ON THE NATION'S FOREIGN POLICY, HIS AIDES SAID.

12. ONE AIDE, AN OFFICIAL HIGH IN THE WHITE HOUSE HIERARCHY, NOTED POINTEDLY THAT, IN HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT, PRESIDENT FORD WILL ATTEMPT WHAT SECRETARY KISSINGER FAILED TO ACCOMPLISH: TO ARRANGE SOME BASIS FOR AN INTERIM NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

13. "IT WILL NOT BE THE PRESIDENT STEPPING IN AND SAYING

TO HENRY, IN EFFECT, 'O.K., YOU'VE HAD YOUR SHOT AND NOW I'M TAKING OVER,' THIS OFFICIAL SAID. "BUT IT IS A REFUTATION OF THE IDEA THAT FORD IS KISSINGER'S PUPPET WHEN IT COMES TO FOREIGN POLICY."

14. REPORTS IN RECENT WEEKS ABOUT EFFORTS BY WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBERS TO FORCE MR. KISSINGER OUT OF HIS WHITE HOUSE STRONGHOLD AS DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN GREATLY OVERBLOWN. BUT FEW OF MR. FORD'S AIDES DENY THAT THERE HAS BEEN AN EFFORT TO LOOSEN MR. KISSINGER'S GRIP ON FOREIGN POLICY AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

15. JUDGING BY MOST ACCOUNTS, MR. FORD HAS BEEN DECREASING HIS RELIANCE ON MR. KISSINGER BY STEADILY WIDENING THE CIRCLE FROM WHICH HE DRAWS ADVICE BEFORE REACHING DECISIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY.

16. THE RECENT DECISION TO LAUNCH A MARINE ASSAULT TO RETAKE THE AMERICAN MERCHANTMAN MAYAGUEZ AND HER CREW WAS AN EXAMPLE.

17. "LOOK AT THE PICTURE OF THE N.S.C. MEETING," SAID ONE RANKING AIDE WHEN ASKED WHO HAD PARTICIPATED IN ADVISING THE PRESIDENT WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE MAYAGUEZ. THE WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING AT WHICH THE DECISION TO ATTACK WAS MADE SHOW THAT A NUMBER OF PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS WHO ARE NOT OFFICIALLY UNCLASSIFIED

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INVOLVED IN FOREIGN POLICY WERE THERE.

18. THEY INCLUDED DONALD RUMSFELD, THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF DIRECTOR, AND JOHN O. MARSH JR. AND ROBERT T. HARTMANN, PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELORS. MR. RUMSFELD IS A FORMER NATO AMBASSADOR. MR. MARSH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR WHITE HOUSE RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS AND MR. HARTMANN IS THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF POLITICAL ADVISER IN THE WHITE HOUSE.

19. THESE AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF ARE INCREASINGLY BEING BROUGHT INTO FOREIGN POLICY. ALL THREE OF THEM, FOR EXAMPLE, HELPED WITH THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON FOREIGN POLICY TO A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS IN APRIL. SO DID RON NESSEN, THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS SECRETARY.

20. "THE PROBLEM WITH THE N.S.C. FROM THE PRESIDENT'S POINT OF VIEW," A WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL SAID, "IS THAT IT IS NARROWLY FOCUSED ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY. BUT THE PRESIDENT CANNOT HAVE INPUT ON FOREIGN POLICY ONLY

FROM PEOPLE WITH TUNNEL VISION. FOREIGN POLICY DOES NOT EXIST IN A VACUUM."

21. THE PRESIDENT WANTS AND IS GETTING ADVICE ON PUBLIC OPINION, CONGRESSIONAL REACTION, POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS AND OTHER POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS, THE AIDE SAID. MOREOVER, HE ADDED, THE PRESIDENT IS GETTING THIS INFORMATION FROM A STEADILY WIDENING CIRCLE OF ADVISERS BOTH WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE WHITE HOUSE.

22. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, CONTRIBUTES VIGOROUSLY TO FOREIGN POLICY DEBATES WHEN NATIONAL SECURITY IS INVOLVED AND IT IS NO SECRET IN WASHINGTON THAT HE AND MR. KISSINGER DO NOT ALWAYS SEE EYE TO EYE. THE FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MELVIN R. LAIRD, IS A FRIEND OF THE PRESIDENT AND IS FREQUENTLY ASKED FOR ADVICE.

23. WHITE HOUSE SOURCES CITE SEVERAL RECENT INSTANCES WHEN THE PRESIDENT REJECTED ADVICE FROM MR. KISSINGER AND UNCLASSIFIED

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THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, ACTING INSTEAD ON OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS. ONE SUCH ISSUE DESCRIBED BY A HIGH WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL WAS THE QUESTION OF UNITED STATES AID TO INDOCHINA AFTER THE FALL OF VIETNAM.

24. ACCORDING TO THIS OFFICIAL, WHO IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL URGED THE PRESIDENT TO ADOPT A POLICY OF LEAVING THE DOOR OPEN TO UNITED STATES AID TO VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA THROUGH THIRD PARTIES SUCH AS THE UNITED NATIONS OR PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS, WHILE RULING OUT ANY DIRECT AMERICAN AID TO INDOCHINA.

25. THIS POLICY WAS OPPOSED BY OTHER WHITE HOUSE ADVISERS, INCLUDING MR. MARSH, WHO TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT CONGRESS WOULD "GO THROUGH THE ROOF" AT ANY SUGGESTION OF AMERICAN MONEY BEING SPENT ON INDOCHINA, ACCORDING TO THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL.

26. THE PRESIDENT DECIDED TO OPPOSE ALL AID.

27. ANOTHER CASE MENTIONED WAS LAST WINTER'S CONFERENCE ON FOOD IN ROME, DURING WHICH SECRETARY KISSINGER PRESSED THE PRESIDENT REPEATEDLY TO ANNOUNCE A SPECIFIC AMERICAN COMMITMENT FOR FOOD AID. THE PRESIDENT, ACCORDING TO ACCOUNTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE, REJECTED THE ADVICE.

28. THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS WHO TALKED OF THE WIDENING POOL OF FOREIGN POLICY ADVICE WERE QUICK TO CONCEDE THAT MR. KISSINGER REMAINED PARAMOUNT AMONG PRESIDENT

ADVISERS IN THIS AREA.

29. "WITHOUT QUESTION, KISSINGER STILL IS THE DOMINANT FACTOR IN FOREIGN POLICY," SAID ONE AIDE, NOTING THAT THE PRESIDENT MEETS WITH HIS SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AT LEAST AN HOUR EVERY DAY.

30. THESE OFFICIALS ALSO CONCEDE THAT NO OTHER ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT CAN MATCH THE KNOWLEDGE OF AND EXPERIENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS PROVIDED BY MR. KISSINGER. THEY UNCLASSIFIED

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ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE PRESIDENT CONTINUES TO HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE IN MR. KISSINGER DESPITE THE RECENT DEFEATS AND SETBACKS FOR UNITED STATES POLICIES AROUND THE WORLD.

31. THESE SETBACKS PROVOKED HEAVY CRITICISM OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND OF MR. KISSINGER AS A PRINCIPAL ARCHITECT OF THAT POLICY FOR OVER SIX YEARS. SOME WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS INDICATED THAT THEY THEREFORE REGARDED MR. KISSINGER AS SOMETHING OF A POLITICAL LIABILITY.

32. AN OFFICIAL WHO IS CONSIDERED ONE OF MR. KISSINGER'S STRONGEST ALLIES INSIDE THE WHITE HOUSE SAID THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE PRESIDENT HAD "DEVELOPED A VERY CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP--THEY HAVE A VERY SIMILAR OUTLOOK ON THE WORLD."

33. THAT MR. KISSINGER IS SECURE IN THE PRESIDENT'S CONFIDENCE IS DEMONSTRATED BY HIS WILLINGNESS TO CORRECT MR. FORD'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, AT A NEWS BRIEFING LAST SATURDAY, HE SOFTENED A BLUNT STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD ABOUT PORTUGAL'S FUTURE IN NATO.

34. IN AN INTERVIEW ON FRIDAY, MR. FORD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN PORTUGAL AND, THEREFORE, ABOUT PORTUGAL'S ROLE IN THE ALLIANCE. THE PRESIDENT SAID HE INTENDED TO DISCUSS THIS "VERY SERIOUS MATTER" IN BRUSSELS.

35. THE FOLLOWING DAY MR. KISSINGER SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF PORTUGAL'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN BILATERAL MEETINGS BUT WOULD NOT BE BROUGHT UP IN PLENARY SESSIONS.

36. MR. KISSINGER SAID THAT THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID AND WHAT HE HAS BEEN SAYING ABOUT PORTUGAL. BUT THE SECRETARY OBVIOUSLY

WAS TRYING TO DRAW SOME OF THE STING FROM THE PRESIDENT'S FRANK REMARKS ABOUT A DELICATE ISSUE THAT WAS TO HAVE

BEEN BROUGHT UP QUIETLY IN BRUSSELS.

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37. MOST OFFICIALS INTERVIEWED CONTRASTED MR. FORD'S STYLE IN MAKING FOREIGN POLICY WITH THAT OF HIS PREDECESSOR, POINTING OUT THAT PRESIDENT NIXON MADE HIS DECISIONS AFTER READING DOCUMENTS AND MEETING WITH MR. KISSINGER. MEETINGS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ARE SAID TO BE MUCH MORE FREQUENT AND FREEWHEELING THAN THEY WERE UNDER MR. NIXON, WHO CALLED THEM RARELY AND THEN USUALLY TO RUBBERSTAMP A DECISION ALREADY REACHED. PRESIDENT FORD IS ALSO SEEING FOREIGN LEADERS MORE FREQUENTLY AND ON A MORE INFORMAL BASIS THAN HIS PREDECESSOR, WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS WHO WORKED FOR BOTH PRESIDENTS SAID.

38. BUT THEY ADDED THAT UNLIKE PRESIDENT NIXON, MR. FORD IS UNLIKELY TO INTRODUCE MANY INNOVATIONS INTO FOREIGN POLICY. "HE IS A PRAGMATIST WHO APPROACHES FOREIGN POLICY ON A PROBLEM-BY-PROBLEM BASIS," A CLOSE AIDE SAID. "HE DOESN'T HAVE ANY STRUCTURED WORLD VIEW. THERE PROBABLY WON'T BE ANY 'FORD DOCTRINE.'"

39. NEVERTHELESS, THE PRESIDENT IS PORTRAYED BY HIS STAFF AS GROWINGLY CONFIDENT OF HIS OWN ABILITIES IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, A CONFIDENCE BUTTRESSED BY 25 YEARS OF DEALING IN FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS AS A MEMBER OF CONGRESS. THEY ADD THAT MR. FORD, LIKE PRESIDENTS, THINKS ABOUT HIS POSITION IN HISTORY AND IS DETERMINED TO MAKE HIS MARK IN FOREIGN POLICY AS WELL AS IN OTHER ASPECTS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION.

40. BECAUSE HE IS NOT DOCTRINAIRE, PRESIDENT FORD'S IMPRINT IS LIKELY TO REFLECT STYLE AND PERSONALITY, ONE OF HIS ADVISERS COMMENTED. SEVERAL AIDES SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT SET GREAT STORE BY PERSONAL DIPLOMACY AND BELIEVED HE COULD DO MUCH IN DIRECT CONTACTS WITH FOREIGN LEADERS.

41. WHITE HOUSE AND STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS WHO BRIEFED REPORTERS ON THE TRIP TO EUROPE SAID THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET LEADERS PARTICULARLY PRESIDENT SADAT BUT ALSO THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE ATLANTIC

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ALLIANCE, WAS A MAJOR REASON FOR THE JOURNEY. (END TEXT) INGERSOLL

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